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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to present a brief primer of the "public interest"
standard that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commis-
sion") uses in reviewing mergers pursuant to the Communications Act. As out-
lined more fully below, precedent dictates that the FCC has independent (and
indeed broader) authority to review communications industry mergers separate
from the authority bestowed upon the Department of Justice ("DOJ") or Fed-
eral Trade Commission ("FTC"), and that this public interest review provides a
useful and unique purpose. To the extent the FCC finds that the proposed
transaction harms the public interest in some way, the Commission is well
within its public interest authority to issue narrowly-tailored conditions to its
approval of the merger.
However, precedent also dictates that the FCC's "public interest" authority
is not unfettered. The public interest test requires an analysis of economic and
competitive considerations, and the courts have sometimes rebuked the FCC
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for not being consistent in this analysis.' Absent a clear nexus to any merger-
related harm, the FCC should not use case-specific merger adjudications to
achieve indirectly via coerced "voluntary commitments" what it cannot do di-
rectly via rulemakings to accommodate particular political constituencies. In-
deed, despite the FCC's mantra over the last decade or so that a merger must
"enhance competition,"2 the case law simply does not support such an expan-
sion of power. To the contrary, the case law is clear that the FCC is bound by
the same standard as antitrust enforcement agencies in that the agency cannot
"subordinate the public interest to the interest of 'equalizing competition
among competitors."' 3 Accordingly, if there are generic, unresolved policy
issues-such as the increasingly contentious issue of network neutrality-then
those issues are better handled in formal industry-wide inquiries or rulemak-
ings where they can be effectively dealt with in a comprehensive manner. Im-
portant issues of public policy should not be decided in the course of closed
negotiations over merger conditions in which only the regulator and the regu-
lated entity participate. In contrast, Notices of Proposed Rulemakings
("NPRMs") or, at minimum, Notices of Inquiry ("NOIs"), have the benefit of
offering the public a complete opportunity to comment on proposals and also
result in consistent, industry-wide resolution of issues that apply across the
board and, hopefully, stand the test of time.
II. WHY DOES THE FCC HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO REVIEW
INDUSTRY MERGERS?
Every few years, and usually in the context of an important telecom or me-
dia merger, policymakers and regulated companies alike question whether the
FCC's review of communications industry mergers is necessary. The DOJ and
the FTC have authority to review mergers under antitrust laws,4 and courts su-
pervise and review this process through Tunney Act proceedings.' While de-
l See discussion infra Part IV.
2 In re NYNEX Corporation, Transferor, and Bell Atlantic Corporation, Transferee, for
Consent to Transfer Control of NYNEX Corporation and Its Subsidiaries, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 32 F.C.C.R. 19,985, 2 (Aug. 14, 1997) (emphasis added) [hereinafter
Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order].
3 Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See discussion infra
Part IV.
4 Section 7 of the Clayton Act proscribes any merger that may "substantially... lessen
competition." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). Mergers of a particular size are not allowed to proceed
until either the DOJ or FTC reviews the proposed transaction for adherence to pre-merger
notification and reporting processes. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, 15 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2006).
5 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). For a good explanation of the Tunney Act process, see Law-
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bates continue about how vigorously various presidential administrations ap-
proach the antitrust process, 6 there is very little serious debate over whether the
antitrust Hart-Scott-Rodino merger pre-approval process is an important (and
sometimes dramatic) check on market power. Yet, given the FCC's recent pro-
clivity to require merged entities to accept voluminous "voluntary" merger
commitments after months of protracted delay, many scholars legitimately
contend that the FCC has no place in reviewing telephone, cable, broadcast,
and wireless industry mergers in addition to DOJ or FTC review.7 As such, it is
appropriate to explore precisely what FCC review adds to this process.
First, FCC has the authority-and the obligation-to review industry merg-
ers because it is the current law. For example, under Section 214(a), "No car-
rier . . . shall acquire or operate any line" without first obtaining from the
Commission a certificate of public convenience and necessity.' Similarly, pur-
suant to Section 310(d), the Commission must find that any transfer of a permit
or license serves the public interest, convenience, and necessity.9 Moreover, the
Communications Act gives the FCC the authority to impose conditions on
transactions so long as those conditions are consistent with applicable law. For
example, Section 214(c) of the Communications Act states that the Commis-
sion "may attach to the issuance of [a 214] certificate such terms and condi-
tions as in its judgment the public convenience and necessity may require."'"
Section 303(r) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Act, the
Commission ... shall ... prescribe such ... conditions, not inconsistent with
rence M. Frankel, Rethinking the Tunney Act: A Modelfor Judicial Review ofAntitrust Con-
sent Decrees, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 549, 551 (2008).
6 See, e.g., David A. Balto, Antitrust Enforcement in the Clinton Administration, 9
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 61, 64 (1999).
7 See, e.g., Randolph J. May, A Modest Plea for FCC Modesty Regarding the Public
Interest Standard, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 895, 904-05 (2008); Randolph J. May, Reform the
Process, NAT'L L. J. May 30, 2005, at 27; PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBER-
SPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 88-90 (1997); Philip
J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger Review by
the DOJ and the FCC, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 197-98 (2008); Bradley Dugan, The FCC's
New Formula for Mergers, 29 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 435, 461-65 (2009) (describing the
contradictory approach of the FCC's approval of the Sirius-XM merger and the denial of the
EchoStar-DirecTV merger); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broad-
band Internet Access, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 15-16, 59 (addressing the inconsistency of
the FCC's merger decisions regarding cable modem operators merging in the late 1990s);
but cf. David A. Curran, Rethinking Federal Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 28
OHIO N. U. L. REV. 747, 753-57 (2002).
8 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2006).
9 Id. § 310(d).
10 Id. § 214(c).
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law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.""
Given the complexity of the communications industry, Congress understood
that while a primary examination of competitive issues by antitrust enforce-
ment agencies is important, the FCC also needs to consider a number of other
factors that are not part of the typical Hart-Scott-Rodino antitrust merger re-
view process. 2 Several of those factors are discussed in Section III below. 3
While the antitrust agencies (via the Hart-Scott-Rodino process) are in an ex-
cellent position to address whether a particular merger would "substantially
lessen competition,"' 4 the Clayton Act standard does not account for how the
continuing presence of other residual "public interest" obligations required by
law-most notably universal service requirements, 5 issues of public health and
safety, 6 foreign ownership restrictions, 7 etc.-affects firms' conduct and in-
dustry structure. 8 Moreover, this dual-review process is not unique to the
communications industry, as Congress also established a dual-review process
for other complex industries, such as electricity and banking, where a similar
dynamic analysis of non-traditional factors must be taken into account. 9
In addition, the antitrust enforcement agencies simply may not have the in-
dustry expertise to understand all of the complexities and nuances of the tele-
"l Id. at § 303(r) (emphasis added).
12 See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 201 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (explaining that even though
the Act removes the FCC's ability to insulate telecommunications companies from DOJ
antitrust review, it does not remove its ability to review for licensing purposes).
13 See discussion infra Part Ill.
"4 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
15 See 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2006).
16 See, e.g., Implementing a Nationwide, Broadband, Interoperable Public Safety Net-
work in the 700 MHz Band, PS Docket No. 06-229, Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R.
15,289 (2007).
'P See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)-(d) (2006). For a general critique of the FCC's handling of
foreign investment in U.S. carriers, see Lawrence Spiwak, From International Competitive
Carrier to the WTO: A Survey of the FCC's International Telecommunications Policy Initia-
tives 1985-1998, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 111 (1998); addendum 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 519
(1999).
18 See United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[R]esolution of the
sometimes-conflicting public interest considerations 'is a complex task which requires ex-
tensive facilities, expert judgment and considerable knowledge of the * * * industry. Con-
gress left that task to the Commission .... ') (quoting McLean Trucking Co. v. United
States, 321 U.S. 67, 87 (1944)).
19 See generally Lawrence J. Spiwak, Expanding the FERC's Jurisdiction to Review
Utility Mergers, 15 ENERGY L.J. 385 (1993) (explaining the process used by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to review utility mergers under the Federal Power Act and
now-repealed Public Utility Holding Company Act); J. Robert Kramer II, Antitrust Review
in Banking and Defense, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv. 111, 115-17 (2002) (explaining how bank
mergers are regulated by the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Commission, and the DOJ).
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com business.2 ° In light of rapid technological change, using the DOJ/FTC Ho-
rizontal Merger Guidelines ("Merger Guidelines")2' as the only guidepost for
reviewing industry transactions could force the merger review process to rely
solely upon a rigid, static view of industry structure.2 Moreover, the Merger
Guidelines are simply not designed to account for the myriad of FCC rulemak-
ings and adjudications that occur literally everyday and which often affect any
static competitive analysis. For both of these reasons, it is not uncommon for
the FCC to detail staff and lend its expertise to the DOJ or FTC to assist in
those agencies' reviews of communications industry mergers under the Clay-
ton Act. 3
Courts have long recognized the FCC's unique expertise in dealing with the
sometimes Byzantine aspects of communications industries. Indeed, in 2005,
the Supreme Court noted that because the FCC must make difficult decisions
regarding issues that "involve a 'subject matter [that] is technical, complex,
and dynamic,"' the "Commission is in a far better position to address these
questions than [a court of general jurisdiction]."24
Recent communications industry transactions present a particularly compel-
ling case for independent FCC review because many of the recent deals flow
directly from FCC policy decisions that favor facilities-based entry or "inter-
modal competition" over other alternatives.25 Indeed, as technology continues
to facilitate convergence among competing distribution platforms, the logical
20 See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Philip J. Weiser, First Principles for an Effective
Rewrite of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory
Studies, Working Paper No. 05-03, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=707124 (noting that "the FCC, despite
its well-known flaws, will remain better suited than antitrust courts for [the role of] ... su-
perintending the efficient development of competition throughout the industry").
21 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELNES
(1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf. In 1996, the DOJ
and FTC issued a joint commentary on the application of the Guidelines, which includes
discussions of how the agencies have applied and interpreted the Guidelines over the last
decade. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES (Mar. 2006), available at
http://www.fic.gov/os/2006/03/CommentaryontheHorizontalMergerGuidelinesMarch2OO6.p
df.
22 Lawrence J. Spiwak, What Hath Congress Wrought? Reorienting Economic Analysis
of Telecommunications Markets After The 1996 Act, ANTITRUST (Spring 1997) at 32.
23 The Effects of Consolidation on the State of Competition in the Telecommunications
Industry: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 21 (1998) (statement
of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice).
24 Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1002-03
(2005) (internal citation omitted).
25 See John Blevins, A Fragile Foundation-The Role of "Intermodal" and "Facilities-
Based" Competition in Communications Policy, 60 ALA. L. REv. 241, 250-54 (2009).
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outcome of a policy focus on "inter-modal competition" has been a phase of
"intra-modal mergers" among similarly situated companies seeking to maxi-
mize economies of scale and scope.26 Given the direct interrelationship be-
tween these mergers and regulatory policy, the FCC stands in an important
position to determine whether these proposed intra-modal transactions will
advance Congress' long-standing policy mandate that "all the people of the
United States [shall have access to] a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-
wide;., communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges
,127
The industry has been down this path before. When the FCC auctioned off
the PCS spectrum in the mid-1990s, it essentially guessed that five wireless
carriers (the existing two cellular carriers plus the A, B, and C PCS spectrum
blocks) was the appropriate number of firms for the market and also supposed
that regional-as opposed to national-geographic licensing would be appro-
priate.28 Prior research has demonstrated that because significant fixed and
sunk costs are inherent in the telecom industry, the number of firms will tend
to reach a relatively concentrated equilibrium.29 But the FCC could not have
known in the early 1990s whether or not five wireless carriers was ideal, and it
erred on the side of caution by auctioning off several licenses in distinct geo-
26 These mergers include continued consolidation among cable multiple system opera-
tors, such as the 2006 acquisition of the Adelphia cable systems by Comcast and Time War-
ner Cable. See In re Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control
of Licenses; Adelphia Communications Corporation, (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-
possession), Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc. (subsidiaries), Assignees; Adelphia
Communications Corporation, (and subsidiaries, debtors-in-possession), Assignors and
Transferors, to Comcast Corporation (subsidiaries), Assignees and Transferees; Comcast
Corporation, Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; Time Warner Inc., Transferor, to
Comcast Corporation, Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203,
1-5 (July 13, 2006) [hereinafter Adelphia Order].
27 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
28 J. Gregory Sidak et al., A General Framework for Competitive Analysis in Wireless
Telecommunications, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1639, 1646 n. 16 (1999); see Kathleen Q. Aber-
nathy, My View from the Doorstep of FCC Change, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 199, 218 (2002).
29 See, e.g., J.B. Duvall & G.S. Ford, Changing Industry Structure: The Economics of
Entry and Price Competition, 7 TELECOMM. & SPACE J. 11, 17-21 (2001); T. Randolph
Beard, George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Why ADCo? Why Now? An Economic Explo-
ration into the Future of Industry Structure for the "Last Mile" in Local Telecommunica-
tions Markets, 54 FED. CoM. L. J. 421, 423-26 (2002); George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky
& Lawrence J. Spiwak, Competition After Unbundling: Entry, Industry Structure and Con-
vergence, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 331, 332-33 (2007) (presenting an economic model demon-
strating that "fixed and sunk costs inherent to the construction and commercial operation of
communications networks" will keep the "equilibrium level of concentration of.. . firms in
local communications markets ... relatively high").
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graphic areas.3" If the natural equilibrium structure favored fewer and larger
national players, then mergers should have been expected as a natural conse-
quence of this initial policy choice in selecting a "starting point."'" Accord-
ingly, the subsequent wave of wireless mergers was an entirely logical out-
come and reaction (or "sorting") by the market in response to a deliberate pub-
lic policy choice. Antitrust agencies and the FCC may view such developments
in a different light: to an antitrust agency, rapid consolidation may signal an
imminent competition problem, while to the FCC, such rapid consolidation is
the expected consequence of a conscious public policy choice. In this envi-
ronment, traditional tools of antitrust analysis might not present a complete
picture of the emerging competitive dynamic.32
The same can be said for competition issues relating to vertical conduct and
acquisitions. The trend in antitrust law has been not to review "vertical" merg-
ers closely, based on the arguments of scholars that such transactions often
promote economic efficiency and only rarely have adverse competitive ef-
fects. 33 In contrast, public policy has traditionally treaded more carefully re-
30 See, e.g., In re Geographic Partitioning and Spectrum Disaggregation by Commercial
Mobile Radio Services Licensees; Implementation of Section 257 of the Communications
Act - Elimination of Market Entry Barriers, Report and Order and Further Notice of Pro-
posedRulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21,831, 1-2 (Dec. 13, 1996).
31 A similar result occurred in radio broadcasting, where FCC rules, until gradually
loosened beginning in the early 1970s, created maximum fragmentation in the industry by
nearly forbidding multi-station owners. See Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., George S. Ford & Tho-
mas Koutsky, Market Power in Radio Markets: An Empirical Analysis of Local and Na-
tional Concentration, 43 J. L. & ECON. 157, 160-64 (2000).
32 Many courts have found this to be true. See, e.g., United States v. Baker Hughes Inc.,
908 F.2d 981, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Thomas, J.) (explaining that market share statistics can
be "easily skewed" and sometimes "'volatile and shifting') (internal citation omitted); S.
Pac. Commc'ns Co. v. AT&T, 740 F.2d 980, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1005 (1985) ("A predominant market share may merely be the result of regulation, and reg-
ulatory control may preclude the exercise of monopoly power .... [I]n such cases market
share should be at most a point of departure in determining whether monopoly power ex-
ists."); Metro Mobile CTS, Inc. v. New Vector Commc'ns Inc., 892 F.2d 62, 63 (9th Cir.
1989) ("Reliance on statistical market share in cases involving regulated industries is at best
a tricky enterprise and is downright folly where . . .the predominant market share is the
result of regulation."). See also Duncan Cameron & Mark Glick, Market Share and Market
Power in Merger and Monopolization Cases, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECIsION ECON. 193, 193
(1996) (asserting that "legal precedent requiring the courts to draw inferences about market
power based primarily or exclusively on market shares and/or market concentration can
often be misleading .... [T]he only alternative to such judge-made bright-line rules is to
utilize modem economic tools to undertake more extensive competitive analyses").
33 See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Mandating Access to Telecom and
the Internet: The Hidden Side of Trinko, 106 COLUM. L. REV 1822, 1834-43 (2007); Mi-
chael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Ap-
proach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 513 (1995).
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garding vertical issues in the communications industry.34 These concerns have
been notable in the context of access to video programming. Congress has
passed laws that limit the ability of cable systems to restrict the distribution of
video programming networks to rivals.35 Since many cable firms are vertically
integrated with the most popular programming networks, concerns over
whether cable mergers would impact the distribution of such programming
networks play an important role in the FCC's merger review process.36
In reviewing cable industry mergers, the FCC makes a careful determination
as to whether such programming distribution issues are better resolved through
company-specific, merger-specific conditions, or whether existing program
access laws, which apply to the industry generally, are sufficient. For exam-
34 In re Teleprompter Corporation; Theta Cable of California; Northwest Cablevision,
Inc. d/b/a Teleprompter of Seattle; Teleprompter Southeast, Inc.; Teleprompter Southeast,
Inc. d/b/a Teleprompter of Boca Raton; Teleprompter Southeast, Inc.; Teleprompter Corpo-
ration; Teleprompter Southeast, Inc.; Teleprompter Corporation; Teleprompter Southeast,
Inc.; Teleprompter of San Bernardino, Inc.; Teleprompter Newburgh Cable TV Corp.; Tele-
prompter of Portsmouth, Inc.; Teleprompter of Mohawk Valley, Inc.; Teleprompter Island
Cable TV Corp.; Focus Cable of Oakland, Inc.; El Paso Cablevision, Inc.; Mobile TV Cable
Company, Inc.; Teleprompter of Fairmont, Inc. Teleprompter Corporation; Teleprompter
Corporation d/b/a Teleprompter of Reno; Northeast Minnesota Cable TV, Inc.; Garden State
Television Cable Corp.; Teleprompter Corporation d/b/a Teleprompter of Tucumcari; Tele-
prompter Corporation d/b/a Teleprompter of Ukiah; Teleprompter Corporation d/b/a Tele-
prompter of Santa Cruz; Teleprompter Corporation; Teleprompter Florida CATV Corp.;
Teleprompter Corporation; Applications for Transfer of Control in the Cable Television
Relay Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 87 F.C.C.2d 531, 61 (July 30, 1981). In
reviewing this cable industry merger, the Commission observed that:
[V]ertical integration has conflicting components, in terms of the incentives involved.
While it may create a natural tendency for the systems involved to deal with affiliated
enterprises, it is also the engine for the creation of new products and services to in-
crease the value of the total package of services offered [to] the public. Given the con-
flicting incentives involved, we believe it would be inappropriate to conclude on any
general basis that vertical integration is undesirable. Rather, what appears to be re-
quired is scrutiny of particular aspects of these vertical relationships for adverse con-
sequences.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
35 See 47 U.S.C. § 548 (2006). In so doing, Congress "sought to promote entry into
local distribution markets through interim limits on strategic vertical restraints between
vertically-integrated cable operators and programmers." James W. Olson & Lawrence J.
Spiwak, Can Short-Term Limits on Strategic Vertical Restraints Improve Long-Term Cable
Industry Market Performance?, 13 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 283 (1994).
36 According to the FCC's last Cable Competition Report, five of the top seven cable
operators--Comcast, Time Warner, Cox, Cablevision, and Advance/Newhouse-hold own-
ership interests in satellite-delivered national programming networks. In total, 84 satellite-
delivered national programming networks are affiliated with one or more of these cable
operators. In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the De-
livery of Video Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, 24 F.C.C.R. 542, 186 (Jan. 16,
2009).
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pie, when the FCC reviewed the acquisition of Adelphia Cable by Time War-
ner Cable and Comcast, it found that transaction would enable Comcast and
Time Warner to raise the price of access to regional sports networks (like
Comcast SportsNet) by imposing uniform price increases applicable to all mul-
tichannel video programming distributors, including their own systems. 37 The
Commission found that "[s]uch a strategy is likely to result in increased retail
rates and fewer choices for consumers seeking competitive alternatives to
Comcast and Time Warner." 8 The FCC found that the acquisition, by increas-
ing the regional "clustering" of cable networks in geographic areas, would en-
hance the cable firms' ability to force local sports teams and local sports view-
ers to deal with the local cable company with regard to showing such sports
events on cable television.3 ' To resolve this merger-specific harm, the FCC
approved the transaction subject to the imposition of narrowly-tailored merger-
related arbitration conditions designed to alleviate the regional sports pro-
gramming problem.4" But the FCC refrained from imposing broader obligations
in response to arguments from competitors that they generally were having
difficulty obtaining affiliated, national programming from Time Warner and
Comcast.4" In that context, the FCC did not impose conditions because it rea-
soned that the existing program access rules were the appropriate forum to
handle such disputes.42
In summary, the FCC has the legal obligation to review communications in-
dustry mergers. This dual review is not unique to the FCC and is also present
in other industries like banking and energy.43 The sheer breadth and complexity
of the communications industry necessitates this dual review, because commu-
nications industry transactions reflect not only questions of static economic
efficiency and market power, but they also reflect the shifting of regulatory
policy and technological change. As the Supreme Court said in Brand X,
"[n]othing in the Communications Act or the Administrative Procedure Act
makes unlawful the Commission's use of its expert policy judgment to resolve
these difficult questions. '
37 See Adelphia Order, supra note 26, 123-24.
38 Id. T 295.
39 Id. 124-27, 298.
40 Id. 1 294-300.
41 Id. TIT 171-74.
42 Id. 11 173-74.
43 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.




III. THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" STANDARD REQUIRES A THOROUGH
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE ISSUES
Properly applied, the FCC's "public interest" merger review authority can
navigate these waters and take into account the complex and unique character-
istics of the communications industry. Precedent makes clear that in reviewing
mergers pursuant to the public interest standard, the FCC must consider com-
petitive effects and conduct a rigorous economic analysis.4" While one can dis-
pute the FCC's application of economics in many prior proceedings, any ar-
gument that the "public interest" standard is devoid of meaning under current
law (and, therefore, that the FCC should abdicate its core responsibilities and
defer to the DOJ or FTC) simply is not supported by case law.' 6
While regulatory agency and antitrust merger review are different, they do
share many of the same goals. As the D.C. Circuit first stated in 1968-and
later reaffirmed in 1980 in United States v. FCC-the "basic goal of govern-
mental regulation through administrative bodies and the goal of indirect gov-
ernmental regulation in the form of antitrust law is the same-to achieve the
most efficient allocation of resources possible."'7 As a result, the D.C. Circuit
"has insisted that the [administrative] agencies consider antitrust policy as an
important part of their public interest calculus."'8 In Town of Concord v. Bos-
ton Edison Co., now Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer wrote that the
goals of regulation and antitrust laws are "low and economically efficient pric-
45 The universal requirement to consider competitive effects under the public interest
standard stands in direct contrast to other, more politically-charged topics, like employee job
concerns, which may only be considered when the statute provides specific language order-
ing the administrative agency to do so. See NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662,
670 (1976). The Supreme Court noted that employee job concerns did not fall within the
scope of the Federal Power Commission's "public interest" inquiry to ensure "just and rea-
sonable rates," because "the use of the words 'public interest' in a regulatory statute is not a
broad license to promote the general public welfare." Id. at 669-70.
46 See supra text accompanying notes 8-24. But see Randolph J. May, The Public Inter-
est Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate to Be Constitutional?, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 427, 453
(2001) ("Congress must ask itself anew whether the public interest standard is indeed suffi-
ciently 'concrete' to fulfill Congress' responsibility to set communications policies for the
Information Age, or whether it is so vague that it can mean whatever three FCC Commis-
sioners say it means on any given day."); RANDOLPH J. MAY ET AL., THE PROGRESS & FREE-
DOM FOUND., DIGITAL AGE COMMUNICATIONS ACT: PROPOSAL OF THE REGULATORY FRAME-
WORK WORKING GROUP, RELEASE 1.0 21 (2005) (characterizing the "current model of regu-
lation" as one "based on vague standards such as 'public interest' and 'just and reason-
able"').
47 United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting N. Natural Gas Co.
v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
48 Id.
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es, innovation, and efficient production methods."'49 As such, assertions that no
relationship exists between antitrust and economic regulation completely miss
the point." Indeed, as Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter stated nearly
sixty years ago, "[t]here can be no doubt that competition is a relevant factor in
weighing the public interest."'"
While FCC review must include some degree of competitive analysis, the
FCC is plainly permitted to come to different conclusions than a strict antitrust
review conducted by the DOJ or FTC may determine. Indeed, the seminal case
regarding the FCC's public interest authority-United States v. FCC-resulted
from the DOJ disagreeing with, and challenging in court, the FCC's approval
of an important transaction in the satellite industry in the 1970s, which the
DOJ believed was anticompetitive. 2 In that case, the D.C. Circuit ruled in fa-
vor of the FCC, stating that all the FCC must do, in the exercise of its respon-
sibilities, is "make findings related to the pertinent antitrust policies, draw
conclusions from the findings, and weigh these conclusions along with other
important public interest considerations."3 The United States v. FCC decision
vividly shows that the FCC's authority, while it includes competition policies,
is a separate and distinct duty from those of the antitrust enforcement agencies.
In effectuating its duties, the FCC has a significantly different standard to
guide its actions."
49 Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990) (Breyer,
C.J.), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 931 (1991).
5o See, e.g., N. Natural Gas Co., 399 F.2d at 961 (stating that antitrust laws are a tool
that a regulatory agency can use to bring "'understandable content to the broad statutory
concept of the 'public interest."' (internal citation omitted). See also United States v.
AT&T, 498 F. Supp. 353, 364 (D.D.C. 1980) (Green, J.) ("[I]t is not appropriate to distin-
guish between Communications Act standards and antitrust standards .... [because] both
the FCC, in its enforcement of the Communications Act, and the courts, in their application
of the antitrust laws, guard against unfair competition and attempt to protect the public in-
terest.").
51 FCC v. RCA Commc'ns, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 94 (1953); see also N. Natural Gas Co.,
399 F.2d at 961 (noting that "competitive considerations are an important part of the 'public
interest"' standard).
52 United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
53 Id. at 82 (emphasis added) (quoting N. Natural Gas Co., 399 F.2d at 961).
54 See In re Applications by American Broadcasting Cos., Inc. For assignment of Li-
censes of Stations WABC, WABC-FM, WABC-TV, New York, N.Y.: WLS-FM, WBKB,
Chicago, Ill.; KGO, KGO-FM, KGO-TV, San Francisco, Calif.; KABC, KABC-FM,
KABC-TV, Los Angeles, Calif. For Transfer of Control of Stations WLS, Chicago, Ill.;
KQV and KQV-FM, Pittsburgh, Pa.; WXYZ, WXYZ-FM, WXYZ-TV, Detroit, Mich. For
Assignments and Transfers of Ancillary Radio Facilities, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
7 F.C.C.2d 245, 15 (Dec. 21, 1966) ("The Antitrust Division is charged with the enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws ... while the Commission is charged with effectuating the poli-
cies of the Communications Act .. "); see also In re Time Warner, Inc., 123 F.T.C. 171,
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The FCC's charge is no easy task, given the complexity and rapidly-
changing nature of the communications industry.5 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
merger review process focuses upon whether the merged firm would be able to
sustain a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price over a very
short time-span and will examine entry that is likely to occur within two
years. " This approach, by definition, largely focuses the attention of the anti-
trust enforcement agencies on the current competitive environment and not on
the environment that is likely to emerge over the next five to ten years. The
FCC's authority under the Communications Act is significantly broader be-
cause the FCC, like other administrative agencies, is "entrusted with the re-
sponsibility to determine when and to what extent the public interest would be
served by competition in the industry."" Therefore, it is not unreasonable to
227 (1997) (Azcuenaga, Comm'r, dissenting). Azcuenaga explained that because the FCC
already had rules in place prohibiting discriminatory prices and practices, there was "little
justification" for the FTC to require Time Warner to "comply with communications law"
and, therefore, to the extent that the proposed consent order offered "a standard different
from that promulgated by Congress and the FCC, it arguably is inconsistent with the will of
Congress"-as such, "[tJhere is much to be said for having the FTC confine itself to FTC
matters, leaving FCC matters to the FCC." Id. (emphasis added).
55 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 196 (1997) (noting that regulato-
ry schemes concerning telecommunications have "special significance" because of the "in-
herent complexity and assessments about the likely interaction of industries undergoing
rapid economic and technological change"); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium,
Inc., v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 742 (1996) ("[We are] aware ... of the changes taking place in
the law, the technology, and the industrial structure, related to telecommunications, see, e.g.,
Telecommunications Act of 1996 ...."); Columbia Broad., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973) ("The problems of regulation are rendered more difficult
because the ... industry is dynamic in terms of technological change ...."); FCC v. Potts-
ville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) ("The Communications Act is not designed pri-
marily as a new code for the adjustment of conflicting private rights through adjudication.
Rather it expresses a desire on the part of Congress to maintain, through appropriate admin-
istrative control, a grip on the dynamic aspects of radio transmission.").
56 See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,554-55, 41,561-62 (Sept. 10,
1992).
57 United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See Northeast Utils. Serv.
Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937, 947-48 (lst Cir. 1993). The court noted that the public interest
standard does not require the administrative agency in question, the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission, "to analyze proposed mergers under the same standards that the [DOJ] ..
• must apply" because an administrative agency is not required to "serve as an enforcer of
antitrust policy in conjunction" with the DOJ or FTC, and thus, while the agency "must
include antitrust considerations in its public interest calculus ... it is not bound to use anti-
trust principles when they may be inconsistent with the [agency's] regulatory goals." Id. See
also Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (explaining that Congress,
through the Communications Act, "gave the Commission not niggardly but expansive pow-
ers."); In re Applications of Craig 0. McCaw and Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5836, 7 (Sept. 19 1994), aff'd sub nom. SBC Commc'ns v.
FCC, 56 F.3d 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that the FCC's "jurisdiction under the Commu-
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expect the FCC to consider the ramifications of its policies over a longer pe-
riod. Given this broader responsibility, it is incumbent upon the Commission,
when reviewing industry transactions, to take a far more dynamic and flexible
approach. 8
Still, commentators have argued that the FCC should simply abandon its
merger review authority and defer all matters of competition analysis to the
DOJ or FTC. 9 But it is not entirely clear that the antitrust legal standards, par-
ticularly the "unfair competition" standard of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act,6" are also not subject to ad hoc manipulation by enforcement
authorities and regulatory excess.6' FCC merger orders under the "public inter-
est" standard are subject to judicial review, just as courts review consent de-
crees entered into by the government and merging parties pursuant to the Tun-
ney Act.62 As such, the argument that somehow the DOJ/FTC process is in fact
inherently "better" or "more consistent" is entirely subjective.
IV. WITH GREAT POWER COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY
Of course, while the FCC clearly has the obligation to examine competitive
issues, a crucial question is whether there are any appropriate limits on the
FCC's authority. Unfortunately, the FCC has in the past interpreted its mandate
incorrectly, and did not limit its review to determining whether a merger is
"in" or "consistent with" the public interest,63 but instead sought to utilize the
nications Act gives us much more flexibility and more precise enforcement tools that (sic)
the typical court has").
58 Olson & Spiwak, supra note 35, at 305-07. See generally Spiwak, supra note 23.
59 See, e.g., Weiser, supra note 7, at 198 ("A central challenge for regulatory agencies
such as the FCC is to defer to the competition policy analysis of the DOJ as well as its
choice of merger remedies. On balance, the agency's duplicative analysis has yielded few
benefits while it has delayed merger approvals and imposed significant administrative
costs.").
60 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
61 As former FTC Chairman Timothy Muris noted, the "unfair competition standard" in
the wrong hands produced "a series of proposed rules relying upon vague theories of unfair-
ness that often had no empirical basis, could be based entirely upon the Commissioners'
personal values, and did not have to consider the ultimate costs to consumers of foregoing
their ability to choose freely in the marketplace." Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Remarks at the Aspen Summit: Cyberspace and the American Dream (Aug. 19,
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/030819aspen.htm#N 49.
62 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. But see Donald J. Russell & Sherri Lynn
Wolston, Dual Antitrust Review of the Telecommunications Mergers by the Department of
Justice and the Federal Communications Commission, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 143, 154
(2002) (noting criticisms that FCC merger decisions are "effectively insulated from mean-
ingful judicial review.").
63 See, e.g., Pacific Power & Light Co. v. FPC, Ill F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1940).
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merger review process to otherwise "enhance the public interest."' As noted
above, critics have legitimately seized upon this inconsistency and claimed that
the FCC has abused its authority to impose narrowly-tailored merger condi-
tions65 and, therefore, cannot be trusted to uphold the basic maxim that compe-
tition policy-either by antitrust enforcement agencies or by administrative
agencies-is designed to protect competition and not individual competitors.
66
However, while the FCC has not always stuck to this fundamental precept, the
law is clear that the FCC must exercise its public interest authority with ana-
lytical rigor and caution.67
The most important limitation on the FCC's public interest standard is the
precept that the focus of the standard is upon the interests of the public, and not
the interests of competitors who may seek to use the merger process to ham-
string a competitor. For example, in the 1981 case of Hawaiian Telephone v.
FCC,6" the D.C. Circuit remanded an FCC grant of Section 214 authority for
service between the U.S. mainland and Hawaii because it found that the Com-
mission had engaged in an ad hoc approach that improperly aimed at "equaliz-
The court found that it is "enough if the applicants show that the proposed merger is com-
patible with the public interest. The Commission, as a condition of its approval, may not
impose a more burdensome requirement in the way of proof than that prescribed by law."
Id. (emphasis added).
64 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Order, supra note 2, 2. In that decision, the FCC,
rather than requiring applicants to demonstrate that their proposed merger was in the public
interest for any number of possible reasons (like efficiency savings that would lead to lower
rates), the FCC stated that
[i]n order to find that a merger is in the public interest, we must, for example, be con-
vinced that it will enhance competition. A merger will be pro-competitive if the harms
to competition ... are outweighed by the benefits that enhance competition. If appli-
cants cannot carry this burden, the applications must be denied."
Id. (emphasis added). Competition is certainly an important goal, but this singular focus on
only that one public interest concern to the exclusion of others was, in our view, improper.
65 See sources cited supra note 7.
66 See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)
("[A]ntitrust laws ... were enacted for 'the protection of competition not competitors."'
(quoting Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962))).
67 Cf Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 69 F.3d 752, 760 (6th Cir. 1995) (reversing FCC
decision because the order contained no "expert economic data or [analogies] to related
industries in which the claimed anticompetitive behavior has taken place" but instead justi-
fied its conclusions as "simply 'common sense"'); FCC v. RCA Commc'ns, Inc., 346 U.S.
86, 93-95 (Frankfurter, J.) (noting that the FCC's economic analysis may not primarily rely
on a "reading of national policy" because agency's actions were simply "too loose and too
much calculated to mislead in the exercise of the discretion entrusted to it.").
68 Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The "public interest" stan-
dard in the Communications Act is applied in many contexts, such as the granting of li-
censes, so court decisions on those topics, like Hawaiian Telephone, provide important in-
sight on the limitations of the FCC authority in this area.
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ing competition among competitors."69 The D.C. Circuit stated that FCC's pub-
lic interest analysis must be more than an inquiry into "whether the balance of
equities and opportunities among competing carriers suggests a change.""0 The
court found that it was "[a]ll too embarrassingly apparent that the Commission
has been thinking about competition, not in terms primarily as to its benefit to
the public, but specifically with the objective of equalizing competition among
competitors.""
Subsequent decisions reiterate the importance that consumer welfare analy-
sis plays in the FCC's public interest standard. In 1995, various parties chal-
lenged the Commission's approval of the acquisition of McCaw Cellular li-
censes by AT&T by arguing that the FCC should have imposed the antitrust
Modified Final Judgment ("MFJ") restrictions applicable to the Regional Bell
Operating Companies ("RBOCs") on the merged firm.72 Citing Hawaiian Tele-
phone, the D.C. Circuit rejected the merger opponents' arguments and found
that the application of the MFJ restrictions to the merged entity would "serve
the interests only of the RBOCs rather than those of the public."73 The court
stated that when the Commission considers whether a proposed merger serves
the public interest, the "Commission is not at liberty . . . to subordinate the
public interest to the interest of 'equalizing competition among competitors. ""
The FCC's merger review authority is also indirectly limited by statute, in
that merger conditions cannot be used to avoid statutory mandates." In 2001,
the D.C. Circuit overturned the FCC's conditional approval of SBC's acquisi-
69 Id. at 774-76.
70 Id. at 776.
71 Id. at 775-76.
72 SBC Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
73 Id. at 1491.
74 Id. (quoting Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasis
added); see also W. Union Tel. Co. v. FCC, 665 F.2d 1112, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("[E]qualization of competition is not itself a sufficient basis for Commission action.").
One of the counter-arguments to this position is the often misguided notion that the naked
"protection of competitors" is the analytical equivalent to attempting to promote tangible
new entry into a market currently dominated by a monopoly incumbent. It is not. As the
FCC's former chief economist argued, it is "important that the playing field should be lev-
eled upwards, not downwards" because "rules that forbid a firm from exploiting efficiencies
just because its rivals cannot do likewise" harm, rather than improve, consumer welfare.
Joseph Farrell, Creating Local Competition, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 201, 212 (1996). In highly
concentrated industries, the focus of policy should be on regulation that promotes competi-
tive entry, rather than regulation that protects competition. The latter will often turn into the
mere protection of the private interests of competitors.
75 Section 303(r) of the Communications Act provides that "except as otherwise pro-
vided in this chapter, the Commission ... shall prescribe such ... conditions, not inconsis-
tent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act." 47 U.S.C. §
303(r) (2006) (emphasis added).
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tion of Ameritech, holding that the FCC unreasonably used its merger review
authority to attempt to allow the merged entity to avoid section 251 obligations
by means of a merger condition.76 This SBC/Ameritech merger condition per-
mitted the merged firm to provide advanced services through a separate sub-
sidiary that would not be subject to the unbundling and resale provisions of
section 251 of the Act." Competitors challenged that decision, arguing that the
FCC's condition was "simply a device to accomplish indirectly what the stat-
ute clearly forbids. . ."" and constituted an unreasonable exercise of the FCC's
merger review authority.79 The D.C. Circuit agreed and called the FCC's action
an attempt to "sideslip § 251(c)'s requirements . *.". ."o Therefore, while the
FCC has statutory authority to review and condition mergers, it does not have
the authority to use merger conditions to circumvent the statutes the agency is
charged with administering.
Finally, legal scholars have expressed concern that the authority to review
mergers is a powerful tool that can easily be misapplied.8' With regard to im-
portant industry transactions, this "hold up" power borders on granting the
agency absolute power for which there is no check or balance. If agencies ap-
proach this task without self-limiting their use of this authority, then the poten-
tial to use the process to aggrandize authority and abuse it will be strong. As
Judge Frank Easterbrook observed well over twenty five years ago:
Often an agency with the power to deny an application (say, a request to commence
service) or to delay the grant of the application will grant approval only if the regu-
lated firm agrees to conditions. The agency may use this power to obtain adherence to
rules that it could not require by invoking statutory authority. The conditioning power
is limited, of course, by private responses to the ultimatums-firms will not agree to
conditions more onerous than the losses they would suffer from the agency's pursuit
of the options expressly granted by the statute. Thefirm will accept the conditions on-
ly when they make both it and the agency (representing the public or some other con-
stituency) better off. Still, though, the agency's options often are potent, and the grant
76 Ass'n of Commc'ns Enters. v. FCC, 235 F.3d 662, 663, 666-68 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
77 See In re Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications,
Inc., Transferee, For Consent to Transfer Control of Corporations Holding Commission
Licenses and Lines Pursuant to Sections 214 and 3 10(d) of the Communications Act and
Parts 5, 22, 24, 25, 63, 90, 95, and 101 of the Commission's Rules, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 14,712, 444-45 (Oct. 6, 1999). Commissioner Harold Furch-
tgott-Roth dissented from this part of the FCC's order. In a separate statement that fore-
shadowed the D.C. Circuit's future ruling, Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth stated that the
conditions adopted were "inconsistent with specific sections of the Communications Act."
Id. (separate statement of Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth).
78 Ass'n of Commc'ns Enters., 235 F.3d at 665.
79 Id. at 668.
80 Id. at 666.
81 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 39 (1984).
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o an application on condition may greatly increase the span of the agency's control."2
Thus, FCC Commissioners should exercise restraint on their collective or indi-
vidual efforts to use the FCC's merger authority to alter the industry through
"voluntary" merger commitments that would otherwise be unobtainable
through the "normal channels."
Accordingly, while the FCC is well within its authority to issue narrowly-
tailored conditions as appropriate to remedy a merger-related harm, viewing
industry mergers as opportunities to promote or jump-start an affirmative pub-
lic policy agenda via so-called "voluntary" merger commitments-particularly
if policymakers are frustrated by an inability to achieve a political consensus
on nationwide rules of general applicability-is a troubling extension of regu-
latory authority by the FCC. While it may be appealing for policymakers to
attempt to advance a policy agenda through merger conditions, using the lever-
age of the merger review process to force a particular outcome down the
throats of one particular firm in the industry ultimately may constitute a viola-
tion of the public trust. Instead of acting consistent with the public interest, the
FCC would be advancing a public policy agenda for which it otherwise may
not have the legal authority or political support.
Moreover, coercing merging parties to accept "voluntary" commitments
may fail to solve industry-wide problems with industry-wide solutions. 3 For
example, AT&T and Verizon respectively agreed to conduct their businesses in
accordance with the Commission's Broadband Internet Access Policy State-
ment 4 as part of voluntary merger commitments made in relation to the SBC-
82 Id. (emphasis added).
83 For example, the FCC was effectively enjoined by the Eighth Circuit from enforcing
the TELRIC pricing rules standard for unbundled network elements with incumbent LECs
and the state commissions. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 794-96 (8th Cir. 1997),
aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, and remanded sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525
U.S. 366 (1999). Bell Atlantic was required to sell network elements at those TELRIC pric-
es by virtue of merger conditions in the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX merger proceedings. See Bell
Atlantic/NYNEX Order, supra note 3, 113. See also Reed Hundt, Chairman, Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks to State Commissioners on the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX Merger
(Oct. 3, 1997), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh758.html. One does
not have to agree or disagree with TELRIC pricing of UNEs to recognize the ad hoc nature
of this policy, as other Bell companies, such as BellSouth and U.S. WEST, were not subject
to such rules.
84 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities; Review of Regulatory Requirements for Incumbent LEC Broadband Telecommu-
nications Services; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of Computer
III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements; Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities; Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling; Appro-
priate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities,
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AT&T and Verizon-MCI mergers. 5 Yet, the nation's cable industry, which
provides more residential broadband connections than AT&T and Verizon
combined, has not been subject to that same network neutrality regime, nor has
Qwest, BellSouth, or the nation's other local telephone or wireless compa-
nies. 6 The merits of such a policy should be debated and considered on an in-
dustry-wide basis in a forum of industry-wide applicability. 7 Only in that set-
ting can the industry and the public actively participate in its construction, ap-
plication, and uniform enforcement.8
The merger condition drafting and adoption process as a practical matter
does not live up to this obligation, as it often occurs in negotiations between
the FCC and the merging entities with very little opportunity for public input
and review. Are consumers really well-served by backroom, closed-door nego-
tiations between the regulator and prospective merging parties over important
public issues? The opportunity for the regulator and the regulated to game such
Policy Statement, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 4 (Aug. 5, 2005).
85 In re SBC Communications Inc. and AT&T Corp. Applications for Approval of
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,290, 3 (Oct. 31,
2005); In re Verizon Communications Inc. and MCI, Inc., Applications for Approval of
Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 18,433, 3 (Oct. 31,
2005).
86 The FCC did sanction Comcast, in its role as an Internet Service Provider, for violat-
ing the Internet Policy Statement in 2008. In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public
Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications;
Broadband Industry Practices, Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that De-
grading an Internet Application Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not
Meet an Exception for "Reasonable Network Management," Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 13,028 (Aug. 1, 2008). However, Comcast challenged that decision in
the D.C. Circuit, which vacated the FCC's order in April 2010. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC,
No. 08-1291, 2010 WL 1286658 at *1-2 (D.C. Cir. April 6, 2010). In late 2009, the FCC
released proposed rules to codify its Internet Service Policy Statement. In re Preserving the
Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 24 F.C.C.R.
13,064 (Oct. 22, 2009).
87 Proponents of such a policy would no doubt prefer nationwide rules of general appli-
cability but might view mergers as a "second-best" alternative. But this temptation should
be avoided because it has the potential to create a complicated patchwork of legal regimes
over which there is a clear, nationwide interest.
88 Using merger related proceedings to change existing regulations also could run afoul
of the Administrative Procedure Act's ("APA") requirements that an agency provide ade-
quate public notice of any pending rule change or decision. See Administrative Procedure
Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006). The Supreme Court has held that if an agency adopts "a new
position inconsistent with" an existing regulation or effects "a substantive change in the
regulation," notice and comment under section 553(b) of the APA is required. See Shalala v.
Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995). The D.C. Circuit recently noted that "fi-
delity to the rulemaking requirements of the APA bars courts from permitting agencies to
avoid those requirements by calling a substantive regulatory change an interpretive rule."
U.S. Telecomm. Ass'n v. FCC, 400 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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a system to the exclusion of important consumer and competitor interests is
strong.
In conclusion, while it is appropriate to impose narrowly-tailored conditions
to remedy specific merger-related harms when consumer welfare is at risk, to
the extent there are policy issues of generic concern, those issues are better
handled in an agency proceeding where they can be effectively dealt with in a
focused, comprehensive, and public manner.89
V. CONCLUSION
Without question, the FCC has the authority and obligation to review com-
munications industry mergers. But this authority is constrained: precedent de-
mands that the FCC establish and carry out a cohesive and rigorous approach
to merger review that is supported by the law, economics and, of course, the
facts. Merger conditions must take into account competitive factors but also
must be in the "public interest" and not the interest of individual competitors
that are looking to saddle their rivals with unique regulatory burdens.
While there are restraints on the FCC's merger authority, the public interest
standard does give the agency great power. Such power begets temptation-
including the temptation to seek to accomplish through merger conditions pol-
icy outcomes that would otherwise be difficult to obtain. But FCC Commis-
sioners should exercise restraint in their efforts to regulate through so-called
"voluntary" merger commitments. Important public policy issues deserve to be
debated openly in industry-wide settings and should not be hidden in the back-
rooms of the FCC.
89 The FCC has recognized this principle. See Adelphia Order, supra note 26, 192
("We find that some of the concerns raised are not transaction-specific and are more appro-
priately addressed in other proceedings.").
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